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VALUATION ON THE FRONTIER:
CALIBRATING ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL
STATEMENTS OF VALUE
RICHARD A. HOFLER AND JOHN A. LIST
Thelackofrobustevidenceshowingthathypotheticalbehaviordirectlymapsintorealactionsremains
a major concern for proponents of stated preference nonmarket valuation techniques. This article
explores a new statistical approach to link actual and hypothetical statements. Using willingness-to-
pay ﬁeld data on individual bids from sealed-bid auctions for a $350 baseball card, our results are
quite promising. Estimating a stochastic frontier regression model that makes use of data that any
contingent valuation survey would obtain, we derive a bid function that is not statistically different
from the bid function obtained from subjects in an actual auction. If other data can be calibrated
similarly, this method holds signiﬁcant promise since an appropriate calibration scheme, ex ante or ex
post, can be invaluable to the policy maker that desires more accurate estimates of use and nonuse
values for nonmarket goods and services.
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Beneﬁt-cost analysis remains the dominant
paradigm used throughout the public sector.
Yet, a recurring issue in properly estimating
the total beneﬁts of nonmarket goods and
services is whether hypothetical statements
map into real behavior. Some recently pub-
lished studies provide evidence that suggests
importantdifferencesexistbetweenresponses
from real and hypothetical valuation ques-
tions.1 This observation triggered a search for
an ex ante and ex post procedure to correct
the systematic bias between intentions and ac-
tionsinvaluationexercises.Recenttechnology
using ex ante procedures has produced some
strong evidence that hypothetical bias can be
overcome by using a “cheap talk” scheme
(see, e.g., Cummings and Taylor; List). Ex post
calibration has also shown some signs of
promise, as work due to Blackburn, Harrison,
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1 See, e.g., Neill et al., Frykblom, and List and Shogren (2001).
But,somesummarystudiessuggestthatbehavioracrosshypothet-
ical and actual regimes is closely associated (Carson et al.). The
interested reader should also see the debate between Cummings
et al. (1997) and Haab, Huang, and Whitehead and Smith.




At this early stage, we believe that both
ex ante and ex post techniques show consid-
erable promise, and we hope that researchers
pursue both avenues as potential solutions
to hypothetical bias. In this study, we extend
ex post calibration schemes by calibrating hy-
pothetical statements to real values using a
relatively new statistical approach—stochastic
frontier estimation. An important advantage
of the frontier approach is that only data that
aretypicallygatheredinacontingentvaluation
survey, such as stated values and other demo-
graphiccharacteristics,areneededtocarryout
the calibration exercise. Our method is there-
fore usable by anyone who has access to con-
tingent valuation data and desires to estimate
2 Elaborated more fully in Harrison, the use of estimated bias
functions to value public goods is at least as old as Kurz. Neverthe-
less, perhaps panelist Roy Radner at the NOAA public meeting
reinvigorated the notion of using ex post calibration techniques
to estimate the demand for nonmarket goods. For example,
Radner asked one speaker: “what would be a practical method,
ifany,oftakingtheresultsofaCVMwillingnesstopayandadjust-
ingthem...inordertocometoadamageassessment?Howwould
one go about that?” (NOAA, 1992, p. 99). Later Radner inquired:
“are there things that one can do when one does the CVM, if one
were to do it, and that would minimize this bias and, secondly,
enable one to estimate it?” (p. 100).
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use and/or nonuse values.3 The initial empir-
ical results are promising. Using real bidding
dataasabenchmark,ourstatisticalmodelpro-
vides individual bid functions (derived from
hypothetical responses) that are not statisti-
cally different from the benchmark bid func-
tions obtained from subjects participating in
an actual auction. If other data can be cali-
brated similarly, then this method holds signif-
icant promise since an appropriate calibration
scheme, ex ante or ex post, can be invaluable
to the policy maker that desires more accurate
estimates of use and nonuse values for non-
market goods and services.
The remainder of our article is organized as
follows.Thenextsectiondescribesthedataand
our ﬁeld experiment. The following section
outlines our estimation methodology. Then
there is a section on empirical results and ﬁ-
nally a concluding section.
Data
We use data from a ﬁeld experiment at a
sportscard show in Denver, CO in December
1995 (List and Shogren, 1998) to compare be-
havior across hypothetical and actual Vickrey
sealed-bid second price auctions, with particu-
larattentionpaidtothestatisticallinkbetween
bids across the two regimes. As has been ar-
gued in previous studies (e.g., List), unlike tra-
ditional ﬁeld studies, ﬁeld experiments repre-
sentanexcitingopportunitytotestthevalidity
and relevance of the predictions of economic
theory because one can take advantage of the
exogenous variation in the variables of inter-
est, allowing for relatively novel tests of eco-
nomictheory.Whileﬁeldexperimentsmaynot
be as “clean” as laboratory experiments, they
havethevirtueofresemblingnaturaleconomic
phenomena as closely as possible. In addition,
they are able to check the robustness of lab-
oratory results in a natural setting, where the
mathematical assumptions of the theory can-
not necessarily be guaranteed to hold. Hence,





tions with “ordinary” consumers—nonsports-
card dealers—each bidding against rivals of
3 AselucidatedinMansﬁeld,manyothercalibrationapproaches
require actual market data from weakly complementary goods
or the identiﬁcation of a proxy good for the nonmarket good in
question.
the same type. The auctioned sportscard was
a Cal Ripken, Jr. 1982 Topps Traded PSA-
graded 9 rookie baseball card, which had a
book value of $350. As elaborated on in List
and Shogren (1998), the ﬁeld experiment can
be described in three simple steps: (a) inspec-
tion of the good, (b) hypothetical bid, and
(c) actual bid. In Step 1, the monitor brieﬂy
explained that in the ﬁrst stage of the experi-
mentwewerehypotheticallyauctioningoffthe
Ripken baseball card displayed on the dealer
table. The participant could pick up and visu-
ally examine the card. The monitor worked
one-on-one with the participant and no time
limit was imposed on his or her inspection of
the card. After the participant had examined
the card, Step 2 began. In Step 2, the partic-
ipant read an instruction sheet that consisted
of two parts: (a) a short socioeconomic survey
(obtaining information on subject age, educa-
tion, income, and gender), and (b) a bidding
sheet. The participant was asked to submit a
hypothetical bid stating the maximum that she
was willing to pay for the card. Instructions
for the bidding sheet stated that the exchange
mechanism was a sealed-bid second price auc-
tion. After the participant ﬁlled out the survey
andplacedthebiddingsheetinanopaquebox,
she stepped to a second table 15 feet away for
a follow-up auction.
In Step 3, monitor B informed the partici-
pant that she now had the chance to actually
bid on the Ripken card that she had just
examined in Step 2. Monitor B gave the
participant a second bidding sheet for the
real auction. After the monitor answered all
questions about the auction, the participant
placed her sealed bid into a second opaque
box. To guarantee that we did not get a second
hypothetical bid, we asked each participant to
acknowledge their actual bid with a signature
and valid telephone number where they
could be contacted.4 Care was taken to avoid
contamination of the results by any ordering
effects (e.g., sealed boxes, monitors not han-
dling or observing bids). Cummings, Harrison,
and Rutstr¨ om (1995) found no evidence of
an ordering effect in a dichotomous choice
setting.
4 One valid concern is whether the participant actually believes
she will have to pay if she wins the auction. In this particular auc-
tion, we received the payment within three days of notifying the
winner. More generally, we have run approximately seven ﬁeld
studies in the sportscard market and this sort of problem has not
emerged.Oneexplanationforthisresultisthatwearedealingwith
actualsubjectsthatcommonlyparticipateinthesesortsofauctions
and a “culture” of honoring bids has developed.Hoﬂer and List Valuation on the Frontier 215















1. Income denotes categorical variable (1–8): (1) Less than $10,000,
(2) $10,000 to $19,999, (3) $20,000 to $29,999, (4) $30,000 to $39,999,
(5) $40,000 to $49,999, (6) $50,000 to $74,999, (7) $75,000 to $99,999
(8) $100,000 or over.
2. Age denotes actual age in years.
3. Gender denotes categorical variable: 0 if female, 1 if male.
4. Education denotes categorical variable (1) Eighth grade or less, (2) High
School (3) 2-Year College, (4) Other Post High School, (5) 4-Year College,
(6) Graduate School Education.
5. Experience denotes number of years involved with the sportscard market.
Table 1 provides a breakdown of selected
characteristics of the auction participants.
Samplesizesandcentraltendenciesofthevari-
ables are similar in nature to data in other
sportscardﬁeldstudies,suchasList.Animpor-
tant attribute of our ﬁeld experiment is that in
addition to gathering important demographic
data, our within-person design permits us to
obtain both hypothetical and real bids from
each subject. In this sense, when calibrating
hypothetical bids, we have an internal bench-
mark, real bids, with which to compare our es-
timated bid function.
A Stochastic Frontier Approach
We employ the stochastic frontier methodol-
ogy developed by Aigner to examine the base-
ball card data. The stochastic frontier was de-
veloped, and continues to be largely used, in
a production efﬁciency context. Since Hoﬂer
and Polachek, however, the scope of stochas-
tic frontier applications has expanded beyond
production.Examplesofnonproductionappli-
cations include estimating reservation wages,
the natural rate of unemployment, and the
labor market effort.
Given that the sportscard data are ob-
tainedfromasealed-bidauctionandarecross-
sectional in nature, we specify a stochastic
frontier
Y H
i = Xi  + vi + ui, i = 1,...,n (1)
which represents a “bid function” for each
person. YH
i represents the hypothetical (ob-
served) bid for person i; Xi is a row vector
of person-speciﬁc bid-determining character-
istics; and   is a column vector of regression
coefﬁcients. The error term v is assumed to
be normally distributed with E(vi) = 0, and
VAR(vi) =  2
v. The one-sided error term is u.
Inconsideringthedistributionalassumption
for the one-sided error term u an interesting
choice emerges. One puzzle that has drawn
much attention in the valuation literature is
whether hypothetical values are equivalent to
real (actual) values. If one assumes that the
commodity is well deﬁned but unfamiliar, the
model outlined in Crocker and Shogren pro-
vides a theoretical structure for a systematic
overstatement of willingness to pay (WTP).




lows the theory of Hoehn and Randall, which
suggests hypothetical bids are systematically
less-than-true values when the good is not
clearly deﬁned and the subject has little time
to develop a value.
This lack of theoretical consensus creates
a serious dilemma for the researcher inter-
estedincalibration.Notonlymustanaccurate
method to calibrate hypothetical statements
be found, but the direction to calibrate must
also be determined. Inherent in our approach
is a test for the correct direction of misstate-
ment (if any) in hypothetical values. The re-
searcher applies the test of the misstatement
direction while estimating the stochastic fron-
tier model. Results of the statistical test in-
dicate whether respondents are systematically
over- or understating their actual values.
The foundation for this directional test is
described as follows: the preferred stochastic
frontier estimation method is to calculate or-
dinary least squares (OLS) estimates as start-
ing points for the maximum likelihood (ML)
estimates. Before beginning ML estimation,
the skewness of the OLS residuals is checked.
Waldman shows that the ML estimator for
the stochastic frontier model’s one-sided error
variance ( 2
u) equals zero if the OLS residuals
areskewedintheoppositedirectionfromwhat
is assumed. This implies that OLS is a MLE,
andtheMLEstepisunnecessary.Insuchcases,
theresearcherhasmadethewrongassumption
concerningthedirectionoftheone-sidederror216 February 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
and must specify a stochastic frontier model




should be positively skewed if the assump-
tion is correct), then the ML estimate of  2
u
equals zero. Conversely, if we assume that hy-
pothetical statements are lower bound esti-
mates of real values and the OLS residuals are
positively skewed (they should be negatively
skewed if the assumption is correct), then the
same result emerges. In both cases, the re-
searcher’s response is to estimate the stochas-
tic frontier model with the opposite error
speciﬁcation.6
We applied the Waldman skewness test to
our Ripken auction data. The correct speci-
ﬁcation was conﬁrmed to be in accord with
the theory of Crocker and Shogren. Hence,
we model u as a one-sided random error term
that takes on only nonnegative values and
represents the distance by which hypothetical
bids exceed actual bids.7 As previously men-
tioned, while some summary studies suggest
that behavior across hypothetical and actual
regimes is closely associated (Carson et al.),
our ﬁnding is consistent with some sets of ex-
perimental data that suggest hypothetical bids
are greater than actual bids (List and Shogren,
2001).
We therefore consider actual (true) bids as
“frontier bids” in our model. That is, they are
unobserved but are potentially estimable. The
modeltobeestimated,equation(1),canthere-
fore be seen as
Y H
i = Y A
i + ui, i = 1,...,n (2)
where YH
i is an observed hypothetical bid; YA
i
is the actual (frontier) bid that is not observed;
ui ≥ 0 with E(ui) =  , and VAR(ui) =  2
u and
Y A
i = Xi  + vi i = 1,...,n. (3)
5 More fully, if this condition emerges, one of two possibilities
exists: either (a) the model is not well speciﬁed or (b) the data are
inconsistent with the model. Once the researcher is conﬁdent that
the model is well speciﬁed, the only remaining conclusion is (b).
6 The astute reader will question whether it is possible for the
alternative speciﬁcation to also yield the ML estimate of  2
u equal-
ing zero. In the authors’ experience with numerous data sets, this
has never been an outcome.
7 As a test, an attempt was made to estimate the stochastic fron-
tier model with the opposite error speciﬁcation. The expected re-
sultoftheMLestimateof 2
u equalingzerooccurred.Thisprovides
evidence that this simple skewness test could possibly be used to
determinethedirectionofthemisstatementofhypotheticalvalues
in other samples.
Based upon our speciﬁcation of ui ≥0, our
model implies that
Y H
i ≥ Y A
i , i = 1,...,n (4)
meaning that actual bids are less than or equal
to hypothetical bids.
The error term ui is a measure of the gap
between true and hypothetical bids for the ith
individual: as ui approaches zero the gap de-
creases, or hypothetical values → real values.
An estimate of ui = 0 implies that the per-
son has truthfully revealed her true bid when
asked a contingent valuation question. As ui
increases, the disparity between the hypothet-
ical and actual bid function is greater.
Therearefourcustomarychoicesforthedis-
tribution of the one-sided error component u:
(a) u is i.i.d. N(0,  2
u) and truncated at zero (a
“half-normal” distribution); (b) u is exponen-
tial; (c) u is i.i.d. N( ,  2
u) where    = 0 and
truncatedatzero(a“truncatednormal”distri-
bution) and u is gamma. A fair question to ask
at this point is, “Will the estimates of the gap
between true and hypothetical bids be sensi-
tive to which of the four error speciﬁcations is
chosen?” It is likely that the gap estimates will
besensitivetoerrorchoice.However,somein-
vestigators have found that the choice matters
little.8 Notwithstanding what they have con-
cluded, we chose to explore this issue by esti-
matingmodelswitheachofthefourerrorterm
speciﬁcations.Theparametersofthemodelare
estimated via ML with the start values derived
from initial OLS estimates.
Finally,notethatJondrowetal.showthatan
estimateofui canbeexpressedastheexpected
value of ui given εi. Extending this notion, we
see that the equivalent of their formula for the
truncated normal u case is:
E(ui |εi) =
  













  , =
 u
 v, 2 = 2
u + 2
v,and
f and F are the standard normal density and
distribution functions, respectively.9 Since  ,
 2
u, and  2
v are parameters estimated by max-
imum likelihood and εi can be computed for
each observation, person-speciﬁc ui estimates
8 Greene (1990) estimated four sets of efﬁciency values with
means between 0.8766 and 0.9011. Ritter and Simar concluded
that the choice among the densities is largely immaterial. Finally,
see Greene’s (2000) Table 9.2.
9 Estimates of ui will be calculated by different versions of (6)
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can be obtained from equation (6). With esti-
mates of ui in hand, the error term vi can be
calculatedsinceεi canbeobtainedeasily.Next,
each person’s calibrated true bid can be calcu-
lated. This permits the researcher to adjust hy-
pothetical bids closer to the true (unobserved)
bid for each person if necessary.
Empirical Results
To illustrate the potential value of the stochas-
tic bid frontier in calibrating hypothetical bids,
we use the baseball card data of List and
Shogren (1998) discussed above. Here, we
push the data somewhat harder and estimate
an individual’s actual value from the relation-
ship between stated hypothetical values and
a vector of regressors. Regressors in vector X
are in the spirit of Mansﬁeld and Blackburn
et al., and include measures of gender, age, ed-
ucation, income, and sportscard market expe-
rience for each of the ninety-nine subjects (see
Table 1 for descriptive statistics). Our estima-
tionprocedurefollowsthreesteps:(a)estimate




of the bid gap ratio (true bid as a percent-
age of hypothetical bid) for each individual,
and (c) calculate the calibrated true bid using
the estimated bid gap ratio and hypothetical
statement.
At this stage, a reader might fairly ask
whether different forms of the bid frontier
yield different calibrated true bids. As this
seems quite possible, we explore the estima-
tion of two different forms. Speciﬁcally, we es-
timatealog-linearbidfrontier(lnyi = xi i +
error term) and a translog frontier.10 The net
effect of our model speciﬁcation decisions is
that we estimate eight models: four different
error speciﬁcations in a log-linear model and
four error speciﬁcations in a translog model.
Concerning Step 3, we are aware of two
methods that make intuitive sense. One
method (method A) involves adjusting each
person’s hypothetical bid by his or her own
estimated bid gap ratio. For instance, if the
hypothetical bid for person j is $50 and her
estimated gap ratio is 0.12 (the true bid is esti-
matedtobe12%ofthehypotheticalbid),then
10 We also considered estimating a Fourier ﬂexible form, but
this requires estimating seventy-one coefﬁcients in our case. With
ninety-nine observations, the degrees of freedom are too small to
permit doing so.
the calibrated true bid is $6. If the hypotheti-
cal bid for person k is $600 and his estimated
gap ratio is 0.90 (the true bid is estimated to
be 90% of the hypothetical bid), then the cali-
brated true bid is $540.
An alternative method (method B) entails
adjusting every hypothetical bid by the over-
all mean gap ratio. For instance, if the hypo-
thetical bid for person j is $50 and the mean
estimated gap ratio is 0.33 (on average across
the sample true bids are estimated to be 33%
of the hypothetical bids), then the calibrated
true bid is $17. If the hypothetical bid for per-
son k is $600 and the mean estimated gap ra-
tio is 0.33, then the estimated true bid is $199.
This method is similar in spirit to the initial
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration’s (NOAA) blue-ribbon panel rec-
ommendation that hypothetical bids be de-
ﬂated using a “divide by 2” rule unless bids
can be calibrated using actual market data
(NOAA, 1994, 1996). One important advan-
tage of both A and B approaches is that the
data demands for estimating the actual bid
function are small—only data that are usu-
ally collected in a typical contingent valuation
survey are necessary. No additional data are
needed to implement the stochastic frontier
model.
At this stage, we have described three de-
cisions affecting the estimation of calibrated
bids: four error speciﬁcations, two functional
forms, and two calibration methods. The con-
sequence of implementing all of these com-
binations is that we generate sixteen distinct
calibrated bid series. This strategy allows us
to explore the robustness of our bid fron-
tier method. And, as previously mentioned,
a novel characteristic of our ﬁeld data is that
we have information on both hypothetical and
actual bids for each individual. This allows us
to compare the calibrated bids with the actual
bids. Hence, we can examine whether the ad-
justed hypothetical bids match the bids actu-
ally made in the Vickrey second-price auction.
This internal validity test serves as a means of
investigating the usefulness of our stochastic
bid frontier approach.
Approaches A and B Both Achieve
Statistical Signiﬁcance
A very reasonable concern of our approach is
whether the true bid distribution is skewed. If
so, then some/all of what we measure as hy-
pothetical bias would be an overstatement of
that bias. Note that we are assuming the errors218 February 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
are the sum of a symmetric and nonsymmetric
distribution. The ﬁrst assumption is, of course,
what most researchers typically assume and is,
in fact, a reasonable assumption in most cases.
In other words, we are not assuming that the
bids are symmetrically distributed. Rather, we
are assuming that the impact of factors such as
random events is symmetric.
Yet, it is certainly possible that even after
controlling for causal variables, the distribu-
tion of WTP values could remain skewed. In
Waldman et al., the authors observe that for
inexperienced bidders in an experimental sit-
uation,bidsfromcontingentvaluationsurveys
are likely to be skewed. To rectify this nuance,
theyrecommendusingaBox-Coxtransforma-
tion.Theyalsoreportthat,usingrealdatafrom
three studies, they ﬁnd the estimated Box-Cox
parameter to be quite small, suggesting that a
log-bid speciﬁcation is appropriate.
Following the guidance of Waldman et al.,
we conducted two Box-Cox tests.11 First, we
applied the Box-Cox test to the model with
hypothetical bids as the dependent variable.
The estimated value of lambda is not signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero, suggesting that the
log-hypothetical bid speciﬁcation is appropri-
ate. This result is consonant with the ﬁndings
inWaldmanetal.Second,wetestedthemodel
withactualbidsasthedependentvariable.The
estimated value of lambda is signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero and close to one, suggesting
that the actual bids are not skewed.
Digging deeper into the issue of bid skew-
ness,wechosetoalsoestimateafrontiermodel
usingtheactualbidsasthedependentvariable.
One of the likelihood function’s parameters is
gamma,whichistheratioofthevarianceofthe
one-sided error over the variance of the com-
posed error:   =  2
u/( 2
u +  2
v).12 Gamma =
0 suggests that no inefﬁciency (skewness) ex-
ists because the numerator variance must be
zero in that case. Estimating a model using
actual bids, the null that gamma = 0 cannot be
rejected. This suggests that the actual bids are
symmetrically distributed conditional on the
observed explanatory variables. This, in turn,
suggests that the asymmetry we observe in
thestochasticfrontiermodelwithhypothetical
bids is due to what we claim—participants’ hy-
pothetical bids systematically overstate their
11 Thanks to an astute referee for suggesting these tests. All of
these tests used the truncated normal speciﬁcation for the one-
sidederror.Wehavenoreasontobelievethattheoutcomeswould
differ with other speciﬁcations.
12 Note that this gamma differs from the gamma in (6), which is
used to estimate ui.
actual bids. Accordingly, we estimate a log-
WTP frontier model.
As stated above, we estimate sixteen differ-
ent bid frontiers. In order to conserve space,
we do not present all sixteen estimated mod-
els.13 Instead, we discuss the results that are
generally consistent across all sixteen models.
Of the ﬁve independent variables (age, educa-
tion, gender, income, and experience), gender
(positive coefﬁcients) and experience (nega-
tivecoefﬁcients)almostalwayssigniﬁcantlyaf-
fect the nature of the hypothetical bid func-
tion at conventional signiﬁcance levels. The
estimated positive coefﬁcients on gender sug-
gest that males offer larger hypothetical bids
than do females. Concerning years of expe-
rience in the sportscard market, the negative
coefﬁcients imply that more experienced bid-
derstendtoplacelowerhypotheticalbidsthan
those consumers that have little sportscard
market experience.
From the sixteen estimated models, we cal-
culate sixteen series of calibrated true bids.
Table 2 displays the means of each of the se-
riesandthemeanhypotheticalandactualbids.
The table also presents results of z-tests of the
null hypothesis that the population mean bid
from the actual auction (or hypothetical auc-
tion) equals the population average for each
calibrated series.14 Each Method A calibrated
bidiscalculatedusingindividualbidgapratios
astheadjustmentfactor.EachMethodBbidis
computed with the series mean estimated bid
gap ratio as the adjustment factor.
To begin the discussion of these results, we
note that hypothetical bids have a mean of
$142 and actual bids have a mean of about
$56. These ﬁrst moments suggest that hypo-
thetical bids observed in the Vickrey second
priceauctionwereabout2.5timesgreaterthan
the actual bids from the same auction institu-
tion. This result is consistent with some pre-
vious studies that compare hypothetical and
actual behavior—on average subjects over-
statetheirpreferencesbyafactorofabout3in
hypothetical willingness-to-pay settings (List
and Shogren, 2001). Table 2 reveals a number
of characteristics of the calibrated bids. First,
the average of all calibrated bids is just un-
der $68. These bids are an average 1.2 times
the size of the actual bids observed in the real
13 All results not displayed in this article are available from the
authors upon request.
14 These z-tests (N is large) use sample variance for the actual
and hypothetical bids and, following Horrace and Schmidt, the
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Table 2. Bids: Hypothetical, Actual, and Calibrated (Calibrated bids estimated 16 different
ways: by model, error speciﬁcation, and method)
Mean
Mean Calibrated
Distance Calibrated Bid Different
Mean Above/Below Bid Different From Mean
Error Calibrated Mean Actual from Mean Hypothetical
Model Speciﬁcation Method Bid Bid Actual Bid?∗ Bid?∗
Log-linear Half-normal A 75.90 20.02 No Yes
Log-linear Exponential A 75.99 20.12 No Yes
Log-linear Truncated normal A 78.99 23.11 No Yes
Log-linear Gamma A 106.34 50.47 Yes Yes
Log-linear Half-normal B 45.33 −10.55 No Yes
Log-linear Exponential B 45.41 −10.47 No Yes
Log-linear Truncated normal B 47.18 −8.69 No Yes
Log-linear Gamma B 68.57 12.70 No Yes
Translog Half-normal A 84.34 28.46 No Yes
Translog Exponential A 80.72 24.84 No Yes
Translog Truncated normal A 88.46 32.58 Yes Yes
Translog Gamma A 71.45 15.58 No Yes
Translog Half-normal B 55.33 −0.54 No Yes
Translog Exponential B 54.54 −1.33 No Yes
Translog Truncated normal B 59.51 3.64 No Yes
Translog Gamma B 47.41 −8.46 No Yes
Overall mean 67.84 11.97




∗Testing H0: Population mean for actual/hypothetical bids = population mean for calibrated bids at 5% level.
These z-tests (N is large) use the sample variance for the actual and hypothetical bids and, following Horrace and Schmidt, the sampling error for the calibrated
bids because they are estimated.
auction: $68 compared to $56. One can readily
see that from a central tendency perspective,
the calibrated mean estimate is much closer
to the true bids than are the hypothetical bids
obtained from the contingent auction (recall
that the hypothetical bids are at an average
2.5 times the size of the actual bids observed
in the real auction: $142 compared to $56.)
We chose to estimate two different func-
tional forms in order to examine the ro-
bustness of our results. Average bids from
both the log-linear model and the translog
model are approximately $68. Thus, there ap-
pears to be little advantage in either model if
one looks merely at the relationship between
the actual bids and the mean calibrated bids.
There also appears to be no systematic advan-
tageinoneformovertheotherinover-(under)
calibration. Five of the calibrated series from
each model overestimate the actual bids and
three of the series underestimate them, on
average.
Bisecting the sixteen calibrated bid series
by either method exposes tendencies in each
method to over- (under) calibrate. All eight
of the series calculated by method A provide
means that exceed the average actual bids: the
meanforallmethodAbidsisnearly$83,which
is approximately 1.5 times greater than the




perspective, method B provides a more con-
servative, and more accurate, calibrated value
than does method A.
Parsingbybothmethodandfunctionreveals
a potentially important lesson. The mixture of
methodandfunctionthatyieldsthemostaccu-
rate calibrated bids is the method B-translog
combination. The series that is closest to the
actual bids (on average) is the translog half-
normal model using method B, which is an as-
tounding 54 cents away from the actual bids.
Furthermore, the four series from the method
B-translog combination are 97% of the actual
bids, on average. This is a remarkable per-
formance from a sample containing only ﬁve220 February 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
independent variables, all of which should be
easily obtainable from most contingent valua-
tion surveys.
Most importantly, both calibrated bid series
outperform the hypothetical series in terms of
estimatingactualbids.Usingz-testsatthecon-
ventional p < 0.05 level, we fail to reject the
null hypothesis that there is no difference be-
tween the mean actual bid and each of the
mean calibrated bids (A and B) in fourteen
of the sixteen cases. Alternatively, we can re-
ject the mean equality of the hypothetical and
actualbids(andhypotheticalandallsixteense-
ries of calibrated bids) from Methods A and B
atthep<0.01level.Theseresultssuggestthat,
in general, the calibrated bid function via both
MethodsAandBdoesnotdifferfromtheaver-
age actual bid observed in the Vickrey second
priceauction,butdoessigniﬁcantlydifferfrom
thehypotheticalbidfunction.Thisresultholds
promise in that the policy maker interested in
making informed decisions might need a cal-
ibration technique that can adequately adjust





behavior for a private good. Our raw data,
which are consistent with several past stud-
ies, support the view that people overstate ac-
tual values when asked a contingent valuation
question.Thecontributionofthearticle,there-
fore, is to derive statistical techniques that
meaningfully adjust these hypothetical bids to
better represent actual bids. Using a calibra-
tion function derived from a stochastic fron-
tier regression model, we ﬁnd promising re-
sults. Our calibrated individual bid functions
closely correspond to actual bid functions ob-
tained in a real auction.
We hope that our empirical methodology,
which only requires data found in most con-
tingent valuation surveys, will represent the
beginning of a research agenda to discover
an appropriate calibration method to estimate
true values. Future research should explore
whether (a) similar results can be produced
using other data, (b) the burden of calibration
canbereducedbyclusteringgoods,and(c)cal-
ibration functions are transferable across in-
dividuals and goods. Researchers have made
use of some of these issues, but given the high
stakes associated with enhancing the credibil-
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